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ABSTRACT
The paper examines the policies pursued by the Philippines in response
to the increasing economic integration and interdependence of nations
and regions around the world, focusing in particular on the country’s
multitrack approach to trade and investment liberalization. The country’s
experience points to the importance of domestic policies that foster
domestic efficiency and competitiveness before one can participate in
regional integration and face global competition. The country first pursued
trade and investment liberalization policies in the 1980s and 1990s to
eliminate the inefficiency of domestic industries arising from its past
protectionist regime. The unilateral liberation efforts resulted in a better
allocation of resources and improvement in the overall competitiveness
of domestic industries. The improved competitiveness enabled the country
to participate in the 1990s in regional trading arrangements——AFTA and
APEC— —and in the much bigger WTO. The challenge facing the country
now is how to deepen and expand its participation in regional integration
as the proliferation of regional trading arrangements has brought forth
many new competitors for the country, both for its export markets and its
sources of foreign direct investment. Areas requiring further reforms are
identified to enable the country to realize the full gains from economic
integration.
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INTRODUCTION
Globalization and the rapid development of information and
communications technology have deepened the economic
interdependence of nations and regions around the world. Markets
are opened allowing producers to penetrate more markets and
consumers to have greater choices. The new competitive setting
requires greater competitiveness so that each nation can participate
in and benefit from globalization.
Greater openness and economic integration, however, require
strategic policy formulation; otherwise, one runs the risk of being
caught unprepared or left behind. To do this, one needs to act on
three fronts: national, regional and multilateral. The development
experience during the past two decades has shown that for a country
to face globalization and participate in economic integration, it must
have domestic industries that are efficient and competitive.
Economic integration presupposes that participating economies have
already attained a high level of competitiveness and maturity of
their production structures to be able to face regional and global
competition (Onguglo and Cernat 2000). This is where a country’s
unilateral trade and investment liberalization policies play a major
role. That is, by fostering domestic efficiency where resources are
allocated according to a country’s comparative advantage,
liberalization policies enable industries to prepare for global
competition. But as industries become competitive, they require
bigger markets to realize economies of scale. Regional integration
and multilateral cooperation then become important as they provide
a country the opportunity to penetrate larger markets.
This paper examines the policies pursued by the Philippines in
response to the new international trade environment, focusing in
particular on the country’s multitrack approach to trade and
investment liberalization. The paper starts in Section 2, which
discusses the country’s unilateral efforts on trade and investment
liberalization and reforms in the services sector, including the
impacts of the reforms on the economy. Section 3 presents the
progress in the implementation of the country’s commitments in57 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
Section 4 addresses the challenges and prospects of deepening and
expanding the country’s economic integration, focusing on the
implications on the country of expanding AFTA for inter-regional
trade. Section 5 concludes by identifying the areas where further
reforms are necessary to enable the country to realize the full gains
from economic integration.
UNILATERAL APPROACH TO LIBERALIZATION
The Philippines has a long history of protectionist regime. Prior
to the 1980s, the country was a classic case of the ‘import substitution
syndrome.’  Industry incentives were distorted, first, by protection,
which was carried out through tariffs, import and foreign exchange
controls, and overvaluation of the peso; and second, by capital
market intervention favoring heavy industry over light industry.
These instruments adversely affected the efficient allocation of
resources by creating bias in favor of import-competing
manufacturing industries over exports and agriculture, and in favor
of consumer goods over capital and intermediate goods. The end
result was an imperfectly competitive structure characterized by
unrealized scale economies and poor economic growth performance.
The adverse effects of antitrade and protectionist regime could
no longer be ignored as social and economic unrest grew toward
the end of the 1970s, prompting the government to undertake major
reforms beginning in the 1980s. Indeed, the past two decades have
witnessed the implementation of substantial industrial reforms in
the Philippines through trade and investment liberalization.
Complementing the industrial reforms are the reforms in the services
sector through liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. The
reforms were aimed at improving efficiency and resource allocation,
and attaining global competitiveness and sustained economic
growth (Medalla 1998).PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 58
Trade liberalization
The country has pursued a series of Tariff Reform Programs
(TRP) since 1981 to reduce the overall level of protection and the
dispersion of tariff protection within and across sectors and
industries. The first phase (TRP I) was implemented in 1981-1985,
where tariff rates were reduced from a peak of 100 percent to a
maximum of 50 percent. The average nominal tariff fell from 42
percent in 1981 to 28 percent at the end of TRP I.
TRP was temporarily put on hold during the second half of the
1980s because of the prevailing political and balance-of-payments
crises at the time. During the period, however, the country
implemented the Import Liberalization Program (ILP), designed to
gradually remove nontariff restrictions on imports, mainly import
licensing requirements or outright import ban. The program resulted
in the reduction of regulated items from 34 percent of the total PSCC
lines in 1985 to 3 percent in 1996 (De Dios 1997).
Tariff reform resumed under TRP II with the implementation of
Executive Order (EO) 470 in August 1991. This phase ended in 1995
with tariff rates clustering around three bands: 10 percent, 20 percent
and 30 percent.
The current round of tariff reforms (TRP Phase III, 1996-2003)
aims at a uniform tariff rate of 5 percent by 2004. Toward this end, a
series of Executive Orders (EO) was issued to gradually restructure
the economy, namely, EO 189 (machinery and capital equipment),
EO 204 (garments and textiles), EO 264 (industrial products), EO
288 (nonsensitive agricultural products), and EO 311 (tariffication
of quantitative restrictions in agricultural commodities). Since 1996,
tariff rates have been clustered at 3 percent (Appendix, Table 1).
Tariff adjustments were also made in response to the adverse
effects of the financial crisis on the economy. EO 465 was issued in
1998 and EO 63 in 1999 to alleviate the difficulties faced by domestic
industries adversely affected by the crisis. The applied tariff rates
on 694 tariff lines for chemicals, textiles, metals and machinery were
temporarily raised to a level at or below those bound in WTO in
1999, after which they were reverted to their old rates (WTO 1999).59 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
Table 1 shows the reduction in nominal tariff rate and effective
protection rate (EPR) as a result of the series of tariff reforms. The
higher EPR of agriculture in the 1990s compared to 1985 was the
result of the tariffication of quantitative restrictions in agricultural
products. The gap in EPR between agriculture and manufacturing
has been substantially reduced.
Competitiveness. One significant effect of trade liberalization is
the increase in the overall competitiveness of the manufacturing
industry, as measured by the ratio of the domestic resource cost
with the shadow exchange rate (DRC/SER)1 (Pineda 1997). The
DRC/SER ratio went down from 1.5 in 1988 to 1.2 in 1994. Industries
that maintained or improved their efficiency and competitiveness
were mostly export-oriented ones. Trade liberalization also resulted
1 DRC measures the social cost of domestic resources used per unit of net foreign exchange
earned or saved by an activity. SER on the other hand, represents the opportunity cost of
domestic resources used in all activities producing tradable goods or the social cost of earning
foreign exchange. The DRC/SER ratio, therefore, measures an activity’s efficiency in earning
or saving foreign exchange. An industry with a DRC/SER ratio of less than or equal to 1 is
considered competitive and efficient; if the ratio is greater than 1, the industry is considered
uncompetitive and inefficient. However, in the study quoted above, this strict criterion was
relaxed to take into consideration possible measurement errors. An industry is therefore
considered competitive and efficient if the DRC/SER ratio is 1.2 and uncompetitive and
inefficient if the ratio is greater than 1.2.
Table 1. Average nominal tariff and effective protection rates, 1985-2000 (%) 
Sectors  1985  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Nominal tariff rates               
  Agriculture       35.00       28.00       28.29       25.28       18.91       16.33       14.40  
  Mining   -  -        5.25         4.73         3.58         3.51         3.27  
  Manufacturing       27.00       19.00       13.37       11.38         9.36         8.98         6.91  
                 
  Overall       28.00       20.00       15.55       13.43       10.69        9.98         7.96  
                 
Effective protection rates             
  Agriculture         9.20       19.70       22.19       19.18       14.27       14.83       14.84  
  Mining          6.10         1.10         0.30         0.79         0.55         0.41         0.43  
  Manufacturing       55.90       22.20       28.16       24.00       13.50       17.83       17.78  
   
  Overall       38.00       20.40       25.43       21.78       13.17       16.32       16.30  
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in better allocation of resources, as shown by the increase in the
share of efficient establishments in the total value of production
(Table 2). Nonetheless, much work still needs to be done as the share
of inefficient establishments remained significant.
Export performance.  The increasing ratio of merchandise exports
and imports to GDP since 1985 clearly indicates the increasing
openness of the economy to the world market (Figure 1).  The decline
in the ratio of imports to GDP in 1997-1998 was due to the financial
crisis.
Unfortunately, the reductions in tariff and import restrictions
have not been accompanied by a consistent exchange rate policy
that favors (or is neutral to) exports (Austria 1997).  The real effective
exchange rate depreciated by 31.1 percent during the period 1982-
1988.  This helped enhance the competitiveness of the export sector
during the early phase of reforms.  However, from 1989 to 1996, the
real exchange rate continuously appreciated because of the increase
in foreign investment. Although the ASEAN economies all
experienced an appreciation of their currency, the Philippines
appreciated the most in the 1990s, resulting in the loss of its
competitiveness vis-à-vis major competitors in the region (Intal
1997).  The effect of this was an export growth in the 1990s that was
lower than that of the latter half of the 1980s (Table 3).  The peso
depreciation during the financial crisis in 1997-1998 did not help
boost exports as the sector grew only by 3.6 percent.  Growth started
to pick up, however, in 1998-1999 at 7.8 percent.
Table 2. Resource allocation and efficiency, 1988 and 1994 
DRC/SER  Efficiency classification 
Share in 
production value  
(%) 
Share in number of 
establishments 
 
    1988  1994  1988  1994 
0 DRC/SER< 1.0  Highly efficient  39.5  41.6  30.2  22.4 
1.0 < DRC/SER < 1.5  Efficient to mildly inefficient  22.8  37.9  27.7  40.5 
1.5 < DRC/SER < 2.0  Inefficient  14.7    7.6  13.0  16.3 
DRC/SER > 2.0  Highly inefficient  21.8  12.9  26.6  20.8 
  Average DRC/SER    1.5  1.2     
Source: Pineda (1997)    Source: Pineda (1997)61 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration





























































































Source: National Income Accounts
The commodity composition of exports has also changed
remarkably since the 1980s (Table 4).  The share of traditional exports
(coconut, sugar, forest products, mineral products, fruits and
vegetables, abaca and tobacco) has been going down while the share
of nontraditional exports (semiconductors, garments, wood
furniture) has been going up.  In particular, the semiconductors and
electronic microcircuits have become the country’s leading exports
since the mid-1980s, with their share to total exports increasing from
30 percent in 1985 to almost 69 percent in 1999.
Table 3. Average annual growth rate of merchandise exports and imports (%) 
  Exports  Imports 
1985-1990  11.3  20.0 
1990-1995  9.7  9.4 
1995-1999  7.3  1.0 
Source: National Income Accounts PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 62
Table 4. Philippine exports, by major categories, 1985-1998 
Category  Value (million US$)  Percent distribution (%) 
  1985  1990  1995  1998  1985  1990  1995  1998 
Traditional exports  1,301  1,437  1,970  1,649      28.11      17.55      11.29            5.59  
Nontraditional, 
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      9.21  
 
      7.18  
 
          6.06  
 
Total  4,629  8,186  17,447  29,497    100.00    100.00    100.00          100.00  
Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbook, NSCB 
However, the heavy reliance of the country on semiconductors
and electronic microcircuits for its export earnings is now becoming
a concern because of their high import content and low value-added
(World Bank 1997). This is further supported by the UNCTAD Report
(1999) that high-technology manufactures accounted for only 27.6
percent of the country’s merchandise exports, in contrast to the
country’s neighbors in the region (except Indonesia whose
performance is worse than the country’s) (Table 5). If the country
were to improve its competitiveness in a globalizing world, its export
base would have to change from primary and labor-intensive exports
to high value-added and high-technology products.











Singapore  58.35  15.33    7.28  10.73 
Taiwan  36.55  19.32  32.74    4.81 
Korea  28.83  24.26  23.67    9.22 
Hong Kong  28.27  11.52  48.72    4.39 
          Indonesia    5.77    6.67  17.36  18.80 
Malaysia  47.57  13.13  10.79  14.66 
Philippines  27.65   3.70  11.54    6.44 
Thailand  31.39  12.58  20.27  12.80 
          China  17.25  13.15  49.39    7.60 
India    5.72    9.60  38.17  20.29 
Mexico  30.95  28.83  18.79    5.39 
Source: World Investment Report, 1999 63 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
Industry performance. The reforms, however, have not produced
significant change in industrial growth yet. This is shown by the
slow growth of the manufacturing sector (Table 6) and the sector’s
almost constant share in GDP (Table 7). Medalla (1998) argued that
“gains from trade reforms are more long-run in nature and may not
readily be apparent.” It is expected, however, that as the industries
have adjusted to the new environment brought about by the reforms,
industrial growth will eventually pick up.
Investment liberalization
Just as the country’s trade regime underwent significant reforms
during the last two decades, so has the investment regime. The
government has sought greater foreign investment by expanding
areas and industries open to foreign investors. Prior to 1991,
eligibility for 100 percent foreign equity was subject to the approval
of the Board of Investments. However, the passing of Republic Act
(RA) No. 7042, known as the Foreign Investment Act of 1991,
liberalized foreign investment by allowing foreign equity
participation of up to 100 percent in all areas, except those specified
in the Foreign Investment Negative List (FINL). In 1996, further
legislation was passed allowing greater foreign participation in
previously prohibited sectors. This, in effect, shortened the foreign
investment negative list.
Table 6. Average annual growth rate, by sector, 1990-1999 (%) 
Sector  1990-1995  1995-1999 
Agriculture  1.5  1.5 
Industry  2.1  2.8 
     Manufacturing  2.0  2.5 
Services  2.6  4.8 
      GDP  2.2  3.4 
Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1999 
Table 7. Distribution of GDP by sector, 1985-1999 (%) 
Sector  1985  1990  1995  1999 
Agriculture  24.6  22.4  21.5  20.0 
Industry  35.1  35.6  35.4  34.5 
    Manufacturing  25.2  25.5  25.3  24.5 
Services  40.4  42.0  43.1  45.5 
Source: National Income Accounts 
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Restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) are now limited
to two areas: (1) Negative List A, which includes areas reserved for
Filipino nationals by virtue of the Constitution or specific legislation
like mass media, cooperatives, or small-scale mining; and (2)
Negative List B, which includes areas relating to defense, risk to
health and morals, and protection of local and small- and medium-
size industries. Examples of these investment areas are the
manufacture of firearms and gunpowder, and sauna and steam bath
houses.
All foreign investors are entitled to the basic rights provided in
the Constitution, such as remittance of earnings, freedom from
expropriation and requisition of investment, and full and immediate
repatriation of capital and remittance of dividends without prior
approval by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), provided the
foreign investment has been registered with the BSP.
The change in the country’s investment policies has been a crucial
factor in building up confidence in the economic prospects of the
country. The value of FDI in the country increased from an annual
average of US$518 million during the period 1987-1992 to US$1,460
million during the period 1993-1998 (Table 8). Nonetheless, the
country’s performance in attracting FDI is still below its neighbors
in the region. The country’s average share in the total FDI inflows
to South, East and Southeast Asia went down from 2.8 percent in
1987-1992 to 2.1 percent in 1993-1998. As the table shows, India and
Vietnam have already overtaken the country in attracting FDI.
Reforms in the services sector
The many regulations in the services sector have rendered the
sectors inefficient. Since services are also inputs into the production
of industries, their inefficiency weakens the competitiveness of the
industry sector and hence, can be costly to the economy as a whole.
Hence, to further improve the country’s competitiveness, the reforms
in the trade sector are being complemented by the reforms in the
services sector. Much of the reforms, however, are still ongoing.65 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
Banking. Competition has been enhanced by decontrolling
interest rates, allowing a limited number of foreign banks domestic
license, lifting the moratorium on opening of new commercial banks,
and substantially relaxing the regulations on bank branching. Two
major laws were enacted: (1) Republic Act 7906, which provided for
the regulation of the organization and operations of thrift banks;
and (2) Republic Act 7721, which liberalized the entry of foreign
banks in the country by allowing foreign equity partnership of up
to 60 percent of the voting stock of existing domestic banks or the
incorporation of a new subsidiary in the country, and the entry of
new foreign bank branches with full banking authority.
The reforms granted licenses to 10 new foreign banks, in addition
to the original four. The increased presence of foreign banks has
induced more competition in the banking industry, encouraging
domestic banks to improve their services and products, globalize
their operations, and build capitalization (Lamberte 1996).
Insurance. The main instrument liberalizing the insurance sector
is the Department of Finance Order No. 100-94, which allows foreign
insurance companies to operate in the country. Likewise, under
Republic Act 8179, amending the Foreign Investment Act of 1991,
the “Negative List C” has been abolished, signifying that insurance
companies can now be 100 percent foreign-owned.
Telecommunications. Deregulation of the telecommunications
industry started with the issuance of Executive Order No. 59 in 1993.
The EO called for the compulsory interconnection of all
telecommunication facilities, effectively abolishing the monopoly
held by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) Company
since 1928. In July of the same year, EO 109 was also issued, requiring
all cellular mobile telephone system and international gateway
facility operators to install at least 400,000 and 300,000 telephone
lines, respectively, within five years. By the end of 1998, 78.7 percent










































6 Table 8. FDI inflows, 1987-1998 
  Country  1987-1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Value (in million US$)           
 Singapore  3,674  4,686  8,550 7,206 7,884 9,710 7,218 
  Taiwan  1,127     917  1,375  1,559  1,864  2,248     222 
  Korea     907     588     809  1,776  2,325  2,844  5,143 
 Hong  Kong  1,886  3,657  4,131 3,279 5,521 6,000 1,600 
                    Indonesia     999  2,004  2,109  4,346  6,194  4,673   (356) 
 Malaysia  2,387  5,006  4,342 4,178 5,078 5,106 3,727 
  Philippines        518  1,238 1,591 1,478 1,517 1,222 1,713 
 Thailand  1,656  1,805  1,364 2,068 2,336 3,733 6,969 
                    China  4,652     27,515     33,787    35,849    40,180    44,236    45,460 
  India       58      550      973  2,144  2,426  3,351  2,258 
  Vietnam     206   1,002   1,500  2,000  2,500  2,950  1,900 
                 
 
Total for South, East and 
Southeast Asia 








  79,397 
 
  87,835 
 
  77,277 
 
                  As a percentage of total FDI inflows to South, East and Southeast Asia (%)    
 Singapore  19.8    9.4  13.9 10.7  9.9 11.1  9.3 
  Taiwan    6.1   1.8    2.2    2.3  2.3    2.6  0.3 
  Korea    4.9   1.2    1.3    2.6  2.9    3.2  6.7 
  Hong Kong   10.2   7.3    6.7    4.9  7.0    6.8  2.1 
                      Indonesia     5.4   4.0    3.4    6.5  7.8    5.3      -0.5 
  Malaysia   12.9       10.1    7.1    6.2  6.4    5.8  4.8 
  Philippines    2.8   2.5    2.6    2.2  1.9    1.4  2.2 
  Thailand    8.9   3.6    2.2    3.1  2.9    4.3  9.0 
                    China   25.1       55.3   55.0  53.5      50.6  50.4      58.8 
  India    0.3    1.1     1.6    3.2  3.1    3.8  2.9 
  Vietnam    1.1    2.0     2.4    3.0  3.1    3.4  2.5 
Source: World Investment Report, 1999 67 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
The deregulation of the industry created an environment
conducive to growth and investments. New players entered, thus
promoting greater competition in the industry. Firms expanded their
networks and introduced new technologies and services. All of these
resulted in a sharp increase in investments in the industry, and in
the number of service providers and users (Austria 2000a).
Maritime industry. The country is also aiming to be a maritime
power in the Asia-Pacific region. The landmark for reform came
with the passing of EO No. 185 in 1994, which liberalized the rules
governing the entry of new operators for existing routes, deregulated
the entry of newly acquired vessels into routes already served by
franchised operators, and allowed the re-routing of existing vessels.
More reforms provided for the deregulation of domestic shipping
rates and accelerated the demonopolization and privatization of
government ports nationwide.
The reforms have generated strong competition through the
provision of a wide variety of choices for consumers at cheaper rates.
In 1996, three shipping lines modernized their fleets and formed a
consortium in anticipation of the competition from new entrants
into the industry.
Civil aviation. The landmark reform came in 1995 with the
passage of EO 219, establishing the international and domestic
liberalization policy of the country. For domestic air transportation,
restrictions on domestic routes and frequencies were eliminated,
including government controls on airfares and charges. For the
international air transportation, the EO allows at least two
international carriers to be designated as official carriers for the
country.
Austria’s study (2000b) shows that liberalization and
deregulation have brought genuine competition in the domestic air
transport industry, resulting in lower airfare, improvement in the
quality of service, and efficiency in the industry in general. The
international air transport industry, however, has yet to bePHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 68
liberalized, that is, provisions of EO 219 concerning the industry
have yet to be implemented. While other countries are adopting
more flexible approaches to liberalization and regulation to meet
the increasing demand for international air services brought about
by the increasing integration of economies, the country is keeping
to its old restrictive practices and policies.
Energy. The energy sector has been subject to several reforms to
enable it to meet growing energy demands. In the electricity sector,
the implementation of EO 215 in 1993 allowed the private sector
(including 100 percent foreign operators) to invest in power-
generating projects through the build-operate-transfer schemes.
Recently approved was the Omnibus Power Industry Bill, which
defines the organization of the electric power industry, outlines the
transition phases, and defines the responsibilities of the various
government agencies and the private sector.
The deregulation of the downstream petroleum industry under
RA No. 8180 in 1997 enabled more suppliers and market-driven
pricing of petroleum products.
Water. The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) was privatized in 1997 with the issuance of Executive Order
No. 311.
PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS
The country’s commitment to greater trade liberalization and
the opening up of the economy in response to globalization and the
growing integration of economies is further manifested in its
membership and commitments in multilateral and regional trading
arrangements in the 1990s. As discussed below, the country’s
regional and multilateral commitments complements well the
country’s unilateral liberalization objectives.69 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
Commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
The Philippines’ accession to the WTO was ratified by the Senate
in December 1994. With a few exceptions, the country did not reduce
tariffs from its unilateral commitments. However, among other
things, the country did commit to the following:
·     To bind tariff rates at a ceiling rate of 10 percentage points above
the 1995 applied rate on some 2,800 industrial tariff lines and
744 agricultural tariff lines representing 63 percent of total tariff
lines;
·     To convert all existing quantitative restrictions on agricultural
imports to tariff equivalents (except rice for which a 10-year delay
was agreed upon);
·       To bind all current restrictions on market access in the following
services sectors: financial services (banking, securities, and
insurance); communications (courier services and value-added
telecommunications); transport services (maritime, road, rail, and
air); and tourism.
·   On the Information Technology Agreement, the country
committed itself to bind to zero the tariff rates of some 188 IT
product lines by 2000 and 47 IT product lines by 2005.
The country subscribed to the full and faithful implementation
of its commitments to the WTO within the agreed timeframes (WTO
1999). In 1996, RA No. 8178 was enacted authorizing the replacement
of all quantitative restrictions on agricultural products with tariffs.
The country also actively participates in the ongoing harmonization
work on rules of origin and sanitary and phytosanitary measures.
On customs valuation, RA No. 8181 was also passed authorizing
the shift from home consumption value to transaction value by the
year 2000. On intellectual property rights, RA No. 8293 was passed
in 1997, providing for the compliance of the country with the Trade
Related Intellectual Property (TRIP) Agreement. As discussed in the
preceding section of the paper, the country has made substantial
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Commitments to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
The long-term goal of APEC, as set out in Bogor, is to achieve
free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by
2010 for developed member economies, and 2020 for developing
member economies like the Philippines.
The Philippines’ commitments to APEC are consistent with its
commitments to WTO and AFTA. On tariff, the commitment is to
gradually phase down tariffs, targeting a uniform rate of 5 percent,
except for sensitive agricultural products, by 2004. This is
considerably more liberal and immediate than the country’s WTO
commitment to bind tariffs at their 1995 levels.
On investment, based on the 1999 Philippine Individual Action
Plan, the country has already complied with seven of the 12 APEC
Non-Binding Investment Principles2 (Austria 2000c). The seven
principles include transparency, nondiscrimination between sources,
investment incentives, expropriation and compensation, repatriation
and convertibility, settlement of disputes and avoidance of double
taxation. The country still imposes restrictions on the principle on
national treatment (i.e., the restrictions are contained in the country’s
negative list for FDI, as discussed earlier). For the principle on
performance requirements, the country committed to a temporary
exception with a definite timetable that matches the WTO deadline.
The compliance with the remaining principles (entry and sojourn
of personnel, investor behavior, and removal of barriers to capital
exports) is subject to existing laws and administrative regulations.
The country’s commitments in the services sector are also beyond
the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Again,
progress in the implementation of commitments on services has been
discussed in the preceding section of the paper.
2  The APEC Non-Binding Investment Principles are APEC’s principles for strengthening the
efficiency in investment administration, eliminating investment obstacles and establishing a
free and open investment environment in the region.71 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
APEC plays a major role in Philippine trade, since the country’s
major trading partners (USA and Japan and, recently, the ASEAN)
are also members of APEC. More than three-fourths of the country’s
exports and imports occur in APEC, and this has been growing
significantly since the 1990s (Figure 2).
Commitments to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
The Philippines is one of the six original ASEAN signatories to
AFTA when it was established in 1992. The objective of AFTA is to
increase ASEAN’s competitive edge as a production base for the
world market (ASEAN Secretariat 1993). The mechanism for
achieving this is through the Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) scheme, where intraregional tariffs will be reduced to 0-5
percent within a 15-year time period beginning in 1993.
Over the years, however, AFTA has taken significant leaps
toward its goal (Austria and Avila 2000). First, the deadline has been
continuously accelerated from the original date of 2008 to 2003 and
finally 2002 (with later implementation dates for its newer members:
Vietnam, Burma, Laos and Cambodia). Second, the coverage of the
CEPT has been widened by including into the scheme products that
were originally excluded (e.g., unprocessed agricultural products).
Third, AFTA has also widened its scope beyond the CEPT scheme
by including other measures to complement and supplement the








































Value of imports (US$ '000)
Share (%)
Figure 2. Philippine trade in APEC, 1994-1998
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harmonization of standards, reciprocal recognition of tests, and
certification of products and removal of barriers to foreign
investment, among others. Finally, and the most important, AFTA’s
original goal of 0-5 percent ending tariff rates was deepened by
targeting a zero ending tariff rates on all products by 2010 for the
original six members, ahead of the original schedule of 2015; and by
2015 for the four new members, ahead of the original date of 2018.
Considering that AFTA’s timetable for zero tariffs is 10 years
earlier than the country’s APEC timetable of 2020, AFTA’s
liberalization process is definitely a great opportunity for the country
to manage its trade reforms more effectively as it prepares for its
eventual integration into a bigger liberalized economic space that is
APEC.
As a result of the integration of more products into the CEPT,
the country’s inclusion list has substantially expanded since the
inception of CEPT in 1993 (Table 9). By 2001, almost 99 percent of
the country’s tariff lines will be included into the scheme. The
country’s average CEPT rate is now down to 4.97 percent and will
be further reduced to 4.07 percent in 2002, the deadline for CEPT
(Table 10). Nonetheless, the country’s CEPT rates are above the
ASEAN average.













1993  4,451  714  28  -  5,193 
1996  4,694  562  28  -  5,284 
1998  5,202  380  28  71  5,681 
2000  5,571    35  27  62  5,695 
2001  5,622     6  16  50  5,694 
             Percent distribution         
1993  85.7  13.7  0.5  -   
1996  88.8  10.6  0.5  -   
1998  91.6    6.7  0.5  1.2   
2000  97.8    0.6  0.5  1.1   
2001  98.7    0.1  0.3  0.9   
  Source: AFTA Reader, 1996 and 1998; ASEAN Annual Report, 1999-2000; ASEAN Secretariat 73 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
Table 10. Average CEPT tariff rates, by country, 1998-2003 (%) 
Country  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Brunei Darussalam  1.35  1.30  1.26  1.17  0.96  0.96 
Cambodia  -  -  10.40  10.40  8.93  7.96 
Indonesia  6.12  5.29  4.77  4.36  3.73  2.16 
Laos  5.00  5.00  7.07  6.58  6.15  5.66 
Malaysia  3.40  3.00  2.85  2.59  2.45  2.07 
Myanmar  4.47  4.45  4.38  3.32  3.31  3.19 
Philippines  7.43  6.54  4.97  4.17  4.07  3.77 
Singapore  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Thailand  10.56  9.75  6.07  5.59  5.17  4.63 
Vietnam  3.92  3.90  7.09  -  -  - 
 
ASEAN  5.05  4.59  3.74  3.54  3.17  2.63 
Sources: AFTA Reader, 1998; ASEAN Annual Report, 1999-2000 
Two issues confront the country, however. First, during the
ASEAN Summit in 1998, the original six members of AFTA were
required to have at least 85 percent of their products in their Inclusion
List to have 0 to 5 percent tariff rates by 2000. This proportion would
then be expanded to at least 90 percent by 2001. As shown in Table
11, however, only 52.5 percent of the country’s products are within
the 0 to 5 percent tariff band. Second, the new goal of zero tariffs on
all products by 2010 requires, as a first step toward the goal, that the
original six members would eliminate tariffs on 60 percent of their
product lines by 2003. However, the country’s current schedule
shows that only 1.4 percent of the country’s products will have zero
tariffs by 2003, in stark contrast to the other ASEAN members, except
Thailand whose schedule is similar to the Philippines’ (Table 12).
This could become a real concern for the country. Given the huge
gap between where the country is now and the goal to be reached
by 2003, the country would need to do substantial work if it were to
meet the 60 percent target by 2003 (Teh 1999).PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 74
Rates  No. of tariff lines  % Distribution 
0-5%  2,958  52.5 
6-9%  107  1.9 
10-12%  863  15.3 
13-17%  355  6.3 
18-20%  882  15.6 
Above 20%  473  8.4 
      Total  5,638  100.0 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat 
 
Table 11. CEPT tariff structure, Philippines, 2000. 
Table 12. Number of tariff lines in the inclusion list scheduled to have 0% tariffs in the  
Year 2003 
Number of tariff lines  Percentage of inclusion list  Country 
0  >0  Other  Total  0  >0  Other  Total 
Brunei Darussalam  5,071  1,146  12  6,229  81.4  18.4  0.2  100.0 
Indonesia  3,897  3,261  -  7,158  54.4  45.6  -  100.0 
Malaysia  4,887  3,587  385  8,859  55.2  40.5  4.3  100.0 
Philippines  76  5,530  -  5,606  1.4  98.6  -  100.0 
Singapore  5,739  -  -  5,739  100.0  -  -  100.0 
Thailand  171  8,895  -  9,066  1.9  98.1  -  100.0 
                  Total  19,841  22,419  397  42,657  46.5  52.6  0.9  100.0 
   Source: Teh (2000) 
Philippine trade is rapidly being integrated with the ASEAN.
This could be seen from the rising share of the ASEAN in Philippine
exports and imports, except in 1997 and 1998 when the share of the
ASEAN in the country’s exports went down because of the financial
crisis in the region (Figure 3). AFTA is contributing to this rapid
integration as the share of CEPT products in Philippine trade to the
ASEAN has been significantly increasing since 1993 (Austria, 1997).
Nonetheless, the share of the Philippines in total intra-ASEAN
exports is the second smallest among the original AFTA members
(Table 13). However, its annual growth rate is among the highest.
Even during the crisis in 1997-1998, exports of the country to the
region grew at 11.2 percent, in contrast to the large fall in intra-
regional exports of the other members (Table 14). In 1999, when
there was a surge in intra-ASEAN exports, the country registered
one of the highest growth rates at 30.5 percent.
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Figure 3. Philippine trade in AFTA, 1994-1998
Source: PC-TAS
              Exports to AFTA                                              Imports from AFTA
Country  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Brunei  1.1  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.3  0.5 
Indonesia  11.4  10.0  9.2  10.3  10.2  13.5  11.0 
Malaysia  30.0  26.2  26.4  28.3  26.8  31.3  29.4 
Philippines  1.8  2.4  3.4  3.7  4.0  5.5  6.7 
Singapore  41.7  46.8  45.0  42.4  41.0  37.8  39.4 
Thailand  13.9  13.7  15.2  14.6  15.3  11.5  13.0 
Vietnam          2.1     
                ASEAN  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Table 13. Percent distribution of intra-ASEAN exports, 1993-1999 (%)
Source: ASEAN Secretariat website (http://www.aseansec.org.sg).
Country  1993-94  1994-95  1995-96  1996-97  1997-98  1998-99 
Brunei  -3.9  13.1  -15.7  11.2  -55.5  69.9 
Indonesia  17.5  9.8  28.8  6.6  5.6  -11.6 
Malaysia  17.3  20.8  23.4  2.2  -6.9  1.3 
Philippines  79.2  65.4  26.0  15.7  11.2  30.5 
Singapore  50.8  15.2  8.4  4.1  -26.4  12.6 
Thailand  33.0  32.8  10.4  12.6  -39.8  21.8 
Vietnam        -24.6     
              ASEAN  34.4  19.7  14.9  4.7  -18.5  8.0 
 
Table 14. Annual growth rate of intra-ASEAN exports, 1993-1999 (%)
Source: ASEAN Secretariat website (http://www.aseansec.org.sg)
EXPANDING AND DEEPENING PARTICIPATION IN
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
The challenge now facing the country is how to respond to the
proliferation of regional trading arrangements (RTAs) beyond its
Source: ASEAN Secretariat website (http://www.aseansec.org.sg)PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 76
current participation in AFTA and APEC. The reasons for the rise
of regionalism have been greatly discussed in the literature (see
Bhagwati 1994; Baldwin 1997; Either 1998; Krueger 1999). During
the past decade, there have been efforts to expand RTAs to include
more members into their fold. In fact, the new wave of economic
integration has moved beyond the regional level to become inter-
regional and even hemispheric (e.g., EU-MERCOSUR, ANDEAN-
MERCOSUR, EU-Chile) (Onguglo and Cernat 2000). The ASEAN
itself is looking at the prospect of closer economic linkage with
Australia and New Zealand. Also, discussions on the formation of
free trade areas by individual ASEAN members with other countries
or RTAs are in progress, such as the Singapore-New Zealand Free
Trade Area and the Singapore-NAFTA linkage.
Likewise, while regional trading arrangements are generally
classified either as free trade areas, custom unions, common markets
or economic unions, the new RTAs contain elements of more than
one of these forms, making economic integration deeper (Krueger
1999). The increasing trend toward the deepening of integration and
the expansion to interregional integration creates pressures for
inclusion of nonmembers and the Philippines is not exempted.
Expanding regional integration
The Philippines needs to expand and deepen its regional
integration for several reasons. One, expanding regional integration
provides an avenue for the country to overcome barriers to trade
beyond what it can achieve within the multilateral framework of
the WTO. This is particularly true for specific sectors that are of
particular export interest to the Philippines like garments.
Also, as the last decade has shown, new forms of barriers to
trade are emerging. For example, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, rules of origin, and other importing country regulations
have been increasingly taking center stage in recent years. The
diverse standards and technical regulations among developed
countries, along with the corresponding testing procedures for
compliance, limit market access and raise production and testing77 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
costs for the country. Likewise, rules of origin have made it harder
for nonmembers to trade with members of RTAs.
The emerging trade barriers are less transparent than tariffs and
hence, much more difficult to deal with. While some of these areas
are also in the WTO agenda, current efforts in dealing with them
are slow in coming. In contrast, RTAs advance liberalization in these
areas much more rapidly than in the WTO.
Two, expanding regional integration increases the country’s
competitiveness, enabling it to compete better in the global economy.
Considering that the country is too small to carry any weight in
influencing the international flow of trade and investments, it needs
to continuously improve its competitive strength for its exports and
its attractiveness to FDI through regional integration. The
proliferation of RTAs has brought many new competitors for the
country, both for its export markets and FDI. The potential
competitors include countries in the ANDEAN Community and
MERCOSUR in Latin America, the emerging economies in Central
and Eastern Europe, which are being slowly integrated with the EU
through bilateral free trade agreements, and China in Northeast Asia.
These countries have the same primary export markets and sources
of FDI as the Philippines, namely, the United States, Japan, and the
EU. They have also become the new sources of cheap labor. Hence,
the Philippines will be faced with discriminatory deals from any
regional trading arrangements of these countries with the country’s
major trading partners.
Finally, the rapid integration of the world has given birth to
global concerns that could only be effectively addressed through
stronger regional cooperation. One such concern is the growth of
organized transnational crimes, like trafficking in illegal drugs and
in human beings and the spread of diseases (Severino 2000). The
financial crisis has also made all too clear the need to strengthen
institutions and improve governance, not only domestically but also
across countries and regions. No one country can address these
concerns by going it alone.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 78
Beyond AFTA and APEC
The Philippines has two alternative approaches to responding
to the challenge of expanding its integration with other countries or
RTAs. The country can respond either bilaterally on its own or
collectively with the ASEAN or APEC. Considering, however, that
the country is too small to carry any weight in influencing the flow
of international trade and investment, it would have greater leverage
and bargaining options if it were to respond and operate collectively
either with the ASEAN or with APEC. After all, as Vejjajiva (200)
has argued, “the ASEAN must recognize that no member country is
as strong individually as they are together.”
Either approach, however, requires that the country’s expansion
for regional integration be consistent with the WTO rules. What this
means is that the integration must be consistent with Article XXIV
of GATT and Article V of GATS3. The ground rules under these two
articles, however, suffer from systemic issues rendering them less
effective in imposing discipline (see Crawford and Laird (2000) for
a discussion of the systemic issues).
Likewise, the integration must be consistent with APEC and
AFTA for it not to undermine the credibility of the country’s
commitments to these RTAs. For the integration to contribute to
global liberalization, it should call for commitments that are beyond
current commitments in AFTA and APEC. What this means is that
since the country is aiming for a free trade area by 2015 under AFTA
and by 2020 under APEC, its expansion for regional integration
cannot be less than a free trade area with a timeframe no longer
than APEC’s or AFTA’s.
3 The conditions for the formation of RTA under Article XXIV include (1) the establishment
of a free trade area among members within a reasonable period of time; (2) the reduction of
tariffs to zero and the elimination of other restrictive regulations on substantially all trade
between the participants; and (3) not raising the duties and other regulations to third countries.
On the other hand, the conditions under Article V of GATS include (1) substantial sector
coverage (in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected, and modes of supply with
no a priori exclusion of any modes); and (2) absence or elimination of substantially all forms
of discrimination through elimination of existing discriminating measures and/or prohibition
of new or more discriminatory measures (Onguglo 2000).79 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
To date, the most feasible new regional trading arrangement for
the Philippines is under the umbrella of a free trade area between
AFTA and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations
(CER), or simply an AFTA-CER Free Trade Area. Last year, AFTA
and CER agreed to look into taking economic integration a step
further through a regional trade agreement between the two regions.
A task force was then established to explore its feasibility. According
to a Center for International Economics study (2000), a free-trade
area between AFTA and CER, with zero tariffs on goods and services,
will result in a gain of US$48.1 billion of GDP (in net present value
terms) over the periods 2000 and 2020. From this amount, AFTA
will gain US$25.6 billion and US$22.5 billion for CER.
According to the same study, the GDP gain for the Philippines
would be 0.32 percent above what might otherwise be by 2010. In
terms of real household consumption, the gain is 1 to 2 percent above
what it might otherwise be by 2005. Current trade between CER
and the Philippines is still small. CER accounted for less than 1
percent and 3 percent of Philippine exports and imports,
respectively, during the period 1994-1998 (Table 15). Nonetheless,
this is expected to grow with an AFTA-CER free trade area.
Table 15. Philippine trade with selected RTAs, 1994-1998 
Exports  Imports  Groupings 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Value (in million US$)                   
  CER  154  164  181  225  185  776  976  1059  1362  894 
  ASEAN Plus Three  2440  3291  4370  4913  5086  7067  8395 10128  11223  9990 
  ANDEAN  3  11  12  11  20  54  55  45  64  18 
                        Share in Philippine trade (%)                   
  CER  1.15 0.95 0.88  0.89 0.63 3.41 3.42 3.05 3.53 2.84
  ASEAN Plus Three  18.34 19.16 21.27  19.47 17.24 31.08 29.47 29.19 29.09 31.68
  ANDEAN  0.02 0.06 0.06  0.04 0.07 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.06
Source: PC-TAS   
Of increasing importance to the ASEAN since last year is its
linkage with its Northeast Asian neighbors— —Japan, China and
South Korea. The ASEAN Plus Three is a strategy for the ASEAN
and Northeast Asian countries to forge deeper cooperation as a
regional group in dealing with international and regional economicPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 80
fora such as the WTO, APEC and ASEM. Philippine trade with the
three countries has been increasing, except during the financial crisis
(Table 15). There is a bright prospect for the Philippines with the
deeper integration of the ASEAN with the three countries— —Japan
being a major export market and source of FDI for the country and
South Korea being an important source of the country’s FDI in recent
years.
More recently, the ASEAN has formed linkage with the
ANDEAN Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela). Philippine trade with the ANDEAN community is very
small (Table 15). The same is true with the trade of the whole ASEAN
region with the ANDEAN. Nonetheless, given the more advanced
integration process of the ANDEAN (i.e., the community is already
a free trade area and is now moving toward a common market), the
ASEAN can learn from the achievements and experiences of the
ANDEAN. Since the relationship between the two regions is just in
its infant stage, there are potentials for greater trade and investment
as information is shared. The potential for forging deeper integration
between the two regions lies in their direct economic links with the
larger APEC region (i.e., the ANDEAN is linked with the members
of APEC (Canada, USA, Mexico, Chile and Peru) through the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) while AFTA is a subregion of
APEC (Austria and Avila 2000).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Philippines has undergone substantial reforms at opening
up the economy during the past two decades. The country’s
experience points to the importance of domestic policies that foster
domestic efficiency and competitiveness before one can participate
in regional and multilateral integration and face global competition.
The country first pursued trade and investment liberalization
policies in the 1980s and 1990s to eliminate the inefficiency of
domestic industries arising from its past protectionist regime. The
unilateral efforts resulted in better allocation of resources and
improvement in the overall competitiveness of domestic industries.81 AUSTRIA : Regional Integration
The improved competitiveness enabled the country to participate
in the 1990s in regional trading arrangements, such as AFTA and
APEC, and in multilateral arrangements like the WTO.
The challenge facing the economy now is how to improve further
its competitiveness so that it can deepen and expand its economic
integration. It is now widely accepted that globalization is
irreversible and is here to stay. While substantial progress has been
achieved in liberalizing the economy, much still needs to be done,
especially in the agriculture sector.
Likewise, other pressing concerns need to be addressed to allow
the country to reap the full gains from economic integration. One of
these concerns lies in the area of competition policy. Liberal trade
and investment policies are a key element of competition policy, as
they eliminate barriers to trade and investment. However, as barriers
to trade and investment are eliminated, the business practices and
behavior of firms are increasingly becoming more important in
fostering efficiency in the economy, more so with the current mergers
and acquisitions of multinational companies as a result of
globalization. Likewise, there are government policies and
regulations that limit competition and hence efficiency. This is
particularly true in the services sector (like civil aviation, shipping,
power, telecommunications and energy). Given their nature and cost
structures, these industries are naturally oligopolistic, and therefore
efficiency could only be attained if there are only few large firms in
the industry. However, although deregulation and liberalization
have been introduced gradually in the sectors, a competition policy
has yet to be defined that would govern the behavior of industry
players to ensure that they do not behave collusively and exploit
their market power. Hence, it is to the best interest of the country to
complement its liberalization efforts with appropriate competition
policy to further improve its global competitiveness.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 82
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Appendix Table 1. Frequency distribution of tariff rates, 1996-2000 
Number of tariff lines  Tariff rate (%) 
1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
0  -  -       11     158     319 
3  2,242  2,295  2,875  2,760  2,703 
5      12      13      63       51     111 
7      10      10      40     107     579 
10    832  1,295     789     856     947 
15  -  -     453     353     407 
20  1,114  1,129     758     880     464 
25        1        1     462     294  - 
30  1,349    840       51      43       61 
35        1        4        1        2        2 
40      32      30      29      30       11 
45  -      36      28      30      30 
50     47      23      12       20      18 
55  -  -   -        1        1 
60     13        1        3      46       46 
65  -      10      10       7        7 
70       1  -  -  -  - 
75  -  -  -  -  - 
80     10       57      53  -  - 
100     57  -  -  -  - 
Specific duties       4        4  -  -  - 
            Total  5,725   5,748  5,638  5,638  5,706 
  Source:  Tariff Commission 